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Respondents Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith, "Smiths11, hereb]
petition the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing of the Appeal taken b}
Appellant Western Auto Radiator Co, , Inc., "Western", from the Judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, The Honorable
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
The points of law or fact which Smiths claim the Court of Appeals
has overlooked or misapprehended are as follows:
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
INDULGED A PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS; WESTERN HAS NOT DISCHARGED ITS
BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR; AND THE RECORD SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN A LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are to be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The policy expressed in Rule 1 is reflected in many decisions of
the Supreme Court holding that findings of fact and judgments should be
presumed

correct;

appellants must

affirmatively

show error; records

should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the findings and
judgment; and that when substantial support exists in the record for the
findings and judgment the lower court result will not be disturbed.
e.g.,

See

Kohler vs. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Hutcheson vs.

Gleaye, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981) and Seaich vs. Union Pac. R. Co., 649
P.2d 48 (Utah 1982).
Further, the appellant has the burden of marshalling all evidence
in support of the findings and demonstrating that even reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence is
still insufficient and if he does not do so, the appellant's attack on
the findings is not to be considered.

Scharf vs. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d

1068 (Utah 1985).
Here, the trial court heard several days of evidence consisting
mainly of one attack after another by the purchasing shareholders on
1

Smiths.
their

The Trial Court heard Smiths' explanations in the course of
testimony

and

considered

Smiths'

time

summaries

showing

the

consumption of their professional time by the litigation.
The evidence shows much of Smiths professional time was consumed
in defending themselves against numerous charges of breaches of fiduciary
duty to Western and to Plaintiffs.

Further, virtually all financial

information assembled for the parties at trial was located or prepared by
Smiths.

See Smiths' original Brief, pages 30-34.

The evidence shows Smiths have incurred substantial attorney's
fees in defending the litigation (and more fees on the appeal).
Judge Conder suggested that the matter of attorney's fees and
Smiths' time be submitted by proffers of evidence rather than additional
testimony, hopefully to conserve court time, and this was done.
Judge Conder heard the evidence presented prior to settlement,
considered Smiths' time and effort and the efforts of Smiths' counsel and
on the basis of the testimony, exhibits, proffered evidence and posttrial memoranda, awarded Smiths much less than they sought and Smiths'
attorney

much

less than would have been an objectively reasonably

attorney's fee.
Judge Conder's Findings, though brief, were adequate.

The court

found Smiths efforts were of benefit to the other parties, including
Western; that Smiths acted in good faith; and that the portion of Smiths'
professional time which was necessarily, fairly and reasonably expended
in connection with the litigation in good faith which should be assessed
against Western Auto Radiator was the sum of $5,514.60 in the case oi
Willard L. Smith and $7,565.60 in the case of Keith Smith; and that, ir
view of all of the circumstances of the case, Defendants Smith were
fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification for said sums and thai
Smiths actually and reasonably incurred attorney's fees and costs oi
court in connection with the Smiths' defense of the law suit and that the
2

services

rendered

in

view

of

the

time

necessarily

expended,

the

qualifications and expertise of counsel and the evidence concerning the
reasonability
$18,450.00

of

attorney's

fees

properly

supported

an

award

together with court costs in the sum of $278.57.

of
(See

Findings of Fact contained in the Appendix to Appellant's Brief).
These Findings of Fact clearly indicated the mind of the Court.
They show that the judgment followed logically from and was supported by
an abundance of evidence.

There can be no reasonable inference other

than that Judge Conder found against a number of contentions made by
Plaintiffs including the contention Smiths should be indemnified at the
rate of only $14.00 or $15.00 per hour.
Judge Conder's Findings of Fact do in fact satisfy the finding
standard of Parks vs. Zions First national Bank, 673 P. 2d 996 (Utah
1983).
The Scharf, supra, rule should have been applied in this case and
Judge Conderfs Judgment affirmed since Appellant failed to marshall the
evidence in support of the findings.
the

trial

court's

findings

and

Appellant's Brief totally ignores

simply

makes

a

number

of

factual

assertions against Smiths, unsupported by and basically contrary to the
findings, with virtually no references to the record.

See Appellant's

Brief, pages 2-16.
Even apart from the Scharf rule, since sufficient evidence does
support Judge Conder's award, his judgment should be affirmed.
vs.

Shoiji, 712 P.2d

197

(Utah

1985);

Shoiji

Sharpe vs. American Medical

Systems, Inc., 671 P. 2d 185 (Utah 1983); and Seaich vs. Union Pacific R.
Co., 649 P.2d 1948 (Utah 1982).
To vacate the judgment and remand the case where it will have to
be tried before an entirely new judge, since Judge Conder has retired
from the bench, unjustly disadvantages Smiths who have already suffered
substantial

economic

loss

from

having
3

a

substantial

part

of their

professional time claim denied by Judge Conder.
Judge Conder was an experienced, seasoned lawyer and a wise trial
judge.

No reason exists for not presuming his findings were proper.
Appellant did not show error or insufficiency of evidence under

the Scharf rule.

Clearly, this case is entitled to application of the

standards of review set forth in the Scharf, Kohler, Hutcheson, Shoiji,
Sharpe, and Seaich cases to bring an end to this costly, expensive, time
consuming litigation.
Apparently

Judge

Richard

Moffat

to

whom

this

case

will

be

assigned has an extremely busy trial calendar and will not be able to
retry this matter until some time next Fall.
If

Smiths

are

compelled

to

retry

the

matter

of

all

the

professional time they spent in defending Plaintiffs' numerous, ever
changing charges and all of the services they performed for Western and
the

other

litigants, and

endeavor

to

put

their

time

into various

categories so Judge Moffat can make comprehensive, detailed findings, and
Judge Moffat makes a new or amended award and once again Western is not
satisfied with the result, then Western will surely appeal again witt
consequent additional consumption of time, energy and scarce judicial
resources.
Further, if the trial courts in Utah are to be required to make
the kind

of

comprehensive, detailed

findings

of fact in all cases

suggested by the Memorandum Decision, such a burden should be establishec
by the Utah Supreme Court, and that only after appropriate discussioi
between the Supreme Court and District Judges in light of Rule 1 because
of the additional substantial burden that places on the trial courts.
Smiths earnestly submit that a fair reading of the Findings
together with Judge Conder!s Memorandum Decision, in view of the facti
and circumstances of this case and the evidence presented below, show,
that substantial justice has been done and that this litigation shouL
4

come to an end by affirmance of Judge Conderfs judgment and that there is
no need for yet additional chapters in this matter.
POINT II. THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THAT THE SUBSTITUTE SUPERSEDEAS
BOND ARRANGEMENT STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES REMAIN IN EFFECT PENDING FINAL
DISPOSITION OF THIS MATTER.
Annexed hereto, marked Exhibit "A", is a copy of the Stipulation
for Security in lieu of supersedeas bond filed in the Third Judicial
District Court together with a copy of the time certificate of deposit
referred to therein.
Paragraph 3 of said Stipulation provides in material part that the
certificate of deposit shall be held pending resolution of the Appeal
taken by Western and should stand in lieu of a supersedeas bond for the
same purpose until the Appeal should be finally resolved.
Western has demanded

immediate, unconditional delivery of the

certificate of deposit in view of the Memorandum Decision of this Court
which vacated the judgment made by Judge Conder although the Memorandum
Decision did not hold Smiths should be awarded nothing and remanded the
case for retrial.
Judge Conder?s award runs only against Western, a corporation
now in the sole control of the Plaintiff purchasing shareholders.

Smiths

are no longer on the Board of Directors.
If Western obtains a return of the certificate of deposit and the
fortune of the radiator repair business later makes it impossible for
Western to pay the award ultimately secured, then great unfairness and
injustice will have been visited on Smiths.
Smiths therefore most earnestly request this Court to direct that
the

supersedeas

substitute

determination

of

entitled

indemnification

to

remain

in

this matter, because

force

and

effect until

final

it is clear

that Smiths are

amount

for

their

interpret the Stipulation

itself

in

some

time

and

indemnification for reasonable attorney's fees.
This Court should

5

to permit

continued
outcome,

holding
or

of

apply

the

Rule

certificate
67, Deposit

of

deposit pending

In

Court,

or

the

Injunction

final
Rule

65A(e)(3), which rules allow the imposition of conditions such as may be
just upon a deposit of money and injunctions against action in violation
of the rights of another party respecting the subject matter of the
action which would tend to render the judgment ineffectual.
Simple justice and fairness to the Smiths entitles them to a
ruling of this Court that, even if they must undergo further trial
proceedings, at least the supersedeas equivalent will remain in effect to
secure the award they ultimately obtain.
POINT III. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE VACATED.
Even if Judge Moffat must retry the case on the indemnity issues
and make extended findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Judgment
already made should not be vacated for Judge Moffat may well come up with
the same award or an award which is even larger in amount.
The present judgment entered by Judge Conder entitles the Smiths
to interest.

Vacating it deprives them of that right.

To apply justice, if this case must be remanded, it should only be
remanded for the making of such additional findings as this Court directs
and for the making of any modifications to the award as Judge Moffat
deems appropriate.
There is no justification for penalizing Smiths with a loss oJ
interest

by

vacating

the

Judgment

because

Smiths

are

indemnity for some amount for their professional time and

entitled tc

for attorney '.<

fees.
POINT IV.
SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO BE INDEMNIFIED A REAS0NABL1
AMOUNT FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL TIME AND FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED II
DEFENDING AGAINST THE MANY CLAIMS AGAINST THEM MADE THROUGH TRIAL.
The Memorandum Decision of this Court suggests in footnote 2, pag«
4,

that

Smiths

may

not

be

entitled

to

be

indemnified

for

thei

professional time or for attorney's fees for time and services past th
6

pre-trial conference.
The Memorandum Decision does not express any reason or policy wh^
such should be the case and entirely overlooks the fact that substantia]
claims were inserted against Smiths by Plaintiff in the pre-trial order,
and further overlooks the fact that numerous additional claims were
asserted against them during the trial itself.

(See Smiths' Brief pages

6 and 11 and R. 230).
The trial court found that Smiths were fairly and reasonably
entitled to be indemnified

for professional time and for reasonable

attorney's fees for defense services beyond the pre-trial conference -- a
necessary

implication

from the amounts awarded

in view of the time

expended, and thus, by implication, found against Plaintiff's contention
(made for the very first time on appeal) that they weren't really serious
about all the claims made against Smiths after all, so Smiths shouldn't
even have defended.
No shadow of reason appears to support this strange contention of
the Plaintiff.

It is the more astonishing for its blatancy!

Further, this footnote and other parts of this Court's Memorandum
Decision suggest the proper approach to indemnification of directors is
narrow and restrictive.

This is clearly not the law.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and a statute in the
state of Utah requires that Utah Statutes be interpreted liberally to
implement their evident intent.

Section 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated

(1953):
"The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the
statutes of this state.
The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are
to be liberally construed with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.
Whenever there is any
variance between the rules of equity and the
rules of common law in reference to the same
7

matter, the rules of equity shall prevail."
There is absolutely no factual or legal basis at all for the
suggestion that the final pre-trial marked the end of any "real threat
to the Smiths" or that the indemnification statute is to be interpreted
narrowly.
If the claims of the purchasing shareholders against Smiths were
frivolous, they should have abandoned them before trial.
would not do so.
unmeritorious.

Plaintiffs

Their numerous, ever changing claims were in fact

That Plaintiff insisted on pursuing unmeritorious claims

only makes them guilty of abuse of process or malicious prosecution.
Such does not justify denial of indemnity to the Smiths for defending
against them.
It is grossly unfair to say that Smiths should not have defended
themselves from manifestly, unfair, inappropriate, unsubstantial claims
by saying such claims posed no real threat to Smiths.
Smiths are entitled to a fair and liberal interpretation of the
indemnification

statute, particularly

where

they

were,

in effect,

successful on the merits because at the time of the settlement between
the other parties, all claims of every kind and nature against them were
dropped by the purchasing shareholders.
This
indemnity

Court
statute

should
in

hold

the

clearly

corporation

and

unequivocally

code

is

to

be

that

the

interpreted

liberally with a view to promoting the objects for which it was enacted
and not restrictively and harshly for the purpose of narrowly limiting
what indemnification a wrongfully sued director can receive from the
corporation.
The

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

should

breadth of the Indemnification Statute, i.e.:
"(3)
To the extent that a director,
officer, employee or agent of a corporation
has been successful on the merits, or
8

recognize the

otherwise, in the defense of any action, suit
or proceeding referred to in (1) or (2) of
this subsection or in defense of any claim,
issue or matter therein, he shall be
indemnified
against expenses
(including
attorney's fees) actually and reasonably
incurred by him in connection therewith."
(Emphasis added) Section 16-10-4(o)(3), Utah
Code Annotated (1953).
Subsection 2 of the statute broadly permits a trial court to
indemnify even a director found liable for negligence or misconduct
where

the

court

determines

"such

person

is fairly

and

reasonably

entitled to indemnity for such expenses which such court shall deem
proper11.

Section 16-10-4(o) (2) , Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Smiths were not found liable for any negligence or misconduct.
Judge Conder determined them to be fairly and reasonably entitled to the
indemnity he awarded them to the amounts he awarded, which was less than
that sought.

He obviously exercised a broad and reasonable discretion

and absolutely no reason appears why his reasoned and fair judgment
should not be sustained.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should recognize the purpose
and intent of the indemnification statute.
narrow,

rigid

especially

interpretation

of

the

If directors must risk a

statute,

few

corporations

small corporations will be able to attract any kind of

qualified independent professional people to serve on their boards of
directors and that is a matter of major public concern today.
The Court should clearly and unequivocally rule that the statute
means the trial court has broad latitude and discretion in determining
what expenses are proper expenses of defense, including

reasonable

attorney*s fees, because that is what the statute says.
Judge Conderfs findings were couched in the terms used by the
indemnification statute.

Shouldn't that be sufficient?

If litigants can now come to this Court, raise all sorts of
questions and issues for the first time and get a ruling requiring a
9

retrial to carefully consider all their new questions and issues and
requiring the lower court to make detailed findings on them, there will
be absolutely no end to litigation.
forever lost.

Justice and fairness will be

Utah will need who knows how many new trial courts to

endlessly consider every new nuance and possibility.

Citizens with less

than unlimited resources will be well advised never to ask the courts
for relief.
Only if substantial policy reasons exist to compel the new trial
judge to categorize

and characterize

Smiths' professional time and

Smiths attorney's fees several ways should there be a remand.

There is

no policy reason for trying to characterize Smiths' litigation-consumed
professional time into accounting services unrelated to defense, or
related to defense or in the nature of expert witness fees or into other
categories unless the purpose be to severely limit Smiths' recovery for
their time and to limit their recovery of attorney's fees.
This Court should clearly hold that a broad interpretation of
expense is indicated by the indemnification statute and that if there
must be a remand, the new trial judge is to liberally construe the
indemnification statute in favor of the Smiths.
This Court should hold that professional outside officers and
directors

are

not

to

be

compelled

to

expend

vast

amounts

of

uncompensated personal time demonstrating their adherence to duty.
This Court should hold directly and unequivocally that Smiths, as
professional, outside directors are entitled to the reasonable value of
all their professional time necessarily consumed by the litigation and
not only limited portions thereof.
If there are policy reasons to the contrary, this Court should
enunciate them and then carefully define and sharply limit what kind of
uncompensated time this Court feels Smiths must contribute and what kind
of attorney's fees they must personally absorb even though they were
10

wrongfully sued as Directors and no fault was found in them.
Smiths urge this Court to recognize the key fact that this
litigation

was

terminated

by

the

other

parties

once

the

shareholder determined that he would agree to a settlement.

selling

There was

no finding or determination that Smiths caused the corporation or the
other parties interested therein any loss or damage of any kind.

There

was no determination they breached any duty.
The settlement which occurred meant that there was absolutely no
opportunity for any final ruling in favor of Smiths on the merits
because all claims against Smiths were abandoned.
There was no opportunity for the lower Court to determine whether
the claims made against

Smiths were in the category of vexatious,

malicious claims, which would entitle Smiths to file another proceeding
for damages for abuse of process or malicious prosecution.
All Judge Conder did was to determine that Smiths were not to be
required

to

bear

the

full

economic

loss

of

contributing

their

professional time to litigation rather than pursuing their independent
CPA practices and to allow them reasonable attorney's fees.
If this is to be remanded for a new trial before Judge Moffat,
this Court should direct Judge Moffat to determine the extent to which
the claims made against Smiths were unsupported and vexatious and to
take that into consideration in determining what award(s) should be made
to Smiths.
POINT V.
SMITHS SHOULD BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST ALL ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE VARIOUS CLAIMS MADE
AGAINST THE SMITHS THROUGH THE TIME OF MID-TRIAL SETTLEMENT AND
THEREAFTER IN PRESENTING CLAIMS MADE BY SMITHS FOR INDEMNIFICATION TO
THE COURT BELOW AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN RESPECT TO DEFENDING THE
INDEMNIFICATION AWARDS ON APPEAL.
This Court's Memorandum Decision suggest that on remand the trial
court should not only scrutinize, distinguish and categorize the Smiths'
activities which comprised

their professional

time consumed by the

litigation but also the nature and kind of legal services performed in
11

respect to their defense and in presentation of their indemnity claims.
The Decision is not clear as to what categories Smiths' legal
services should be fitted into, nor is any reason postulated why such an
approach should be taken.
Smiths submit there is no reason for trying to make such fine
distinctions under the broad

terms of the indemnification statute,

especially in view of the fact the trial court's legal fees award was
modest and substantially less than sought.
The helpful expert witness, implied contract and trustee defense
cost

entitlement

doctrines

are

additional

reasons

to construe the

indemnification statute fairly in favor of Smiths and not reasons to cut
down Judge Conder's award by endeavoring to fit Smiths' time or legal
fees into categories.
In this case Smiths were sued as officers and directors of
Western and were required to defend.
sat in conferences.
summaries.

They tried to be helpful.

They explained accounting matters.

They researched tax complications.

They lost all that time to being sued.

They

They prepared

They testified in Court.

They received no monthly salary

or other regular payments from Western as did all the other parties to
the litigation.
This Court should not suggest that some of Smiths' time was
compensable and some was not without a good reason.

Nor should this

Court hold some of their attorney's fees were compensable and some not
without a good reason.
Appellant has not shown any reason why the attorney's fees award
was improper.

Appellant did not urge Judge Conder to divide Smiths'

counsel's time into compensable and non-compensable categories.
The Utah Supreme Court has not apparently had an occasion to
interpret the indemnification section of Section 16-10-4(o) of Utah
Business Corporation Act.

This case provides a significant opportunity
12

to provide helpful guidance in this area.
The

question

of whether

the

statute

is to be

liberally or

narrowly construed is a matter of considerable importance.
This Court should rule it is to be liberally construed and why
and publish its decision.
POINT VI. THE SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR DEFENDING THE APPEAL.
The Memorandum Decision overlooks the issue of Smiths entitlement
to indemnification for attorney's fees for legal services on appeal.
See Point 5 of Smiths' appeal brief.
If the case must be remanded, as matters now stand, Judge Moffat
is without guidance on this point.
No reason exist to deprive Smiths of the expense of defending the
award made by Judge Conder on appeal.
Certainly a proper liberal interpretation of the indemnification
Statute entitles them to fees on the appeal.

This is first a question

of law -- of statute interpretation and policy.
courts

ultimately,

and

not

the

trial

It is for the appellate

courts,

to

make

legal

interpretations and to determine how statutes are to be interpreted and
applied.
This Court should directly and affirmatively hold that Smiths are
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees for the Appeal.
Western now argues that this Court has ruled Smiths have to bear
their own attorney's fees on appeal because of the final sentence in the
Memorandum Decision which states: " The parties shall bear their own
costs of this Appeal."

Counsel for Western argues "costs" include

Smiths' attorney's fees for the defense of the appeal.
Rule 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals defines "costs
on appeal" and the definition does not include attorney's fees.
This

Court

should

clearly hold that Smiths are entitled to

attorney's fees for defending the appeal and for attorney's fees in any
L3

further pursuit of indemnification before Judge Moffat.
If this Court is of the opinion that any substantial portion of
their attorney's fees must be born by Smiths, the service denied should
be made clear and the reason why stated.
CONCLUSION
Judge Conder's findings in terms of the indemnification statute
should be indulged a presumption of correctness since Western failed to
demonstrate insufficiency of the evidence to support them and because,
in fact, substantial evidence does support them.
Judge

Conder's

Findings

in the broad

fairness terms of the

indemnification statute are sufficiently indicative of the Court's mind
to satisfy the Parks vs. Zions First National Bank standard.
The indemnification statute should be liberally interpreted to
effect

the

objects

thereof.

A

liberal

interpretation

mandates

affirmance of Judge Conder's decision.
If a burden of making more comprehensive factual findings than
very often happens is to be imposed, such should be imposed by the
Supreme Court, which should very carefully consider such matters in
light of the practices and policies of District Judges and the trial
burdens which they face.
The award should not be vacated.

If the case has to be remanded,

the decision should be left in place and Judge Moffat should be directed
only

to modify

the

judgment

to

the

extent

he deems modification

appropriate in view of the evidence which will have to be reproduced at
a retrial.

This Court should rule that a liberal interpretation of the

indemnification statute should be taken by Judge Moffat in retrying the
matter.
This Court should rule that the supersedeas arrangement made
will be continued until judgment finality.
The Court should hold that Smiths are entitled to reasonable
14

attorney's fees for legal services on appeal and in connection with this
Petition and to a further award of counsel fees in pursuing any further
trial proceedings.
The

remand

should

be

limited

to

determining

the

amount of

attorney's fees to be added to the award for services on appeal.
DATED this 30th day of/W^rch,

DAVID S. COOK
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
Willard L. Smith and
Keith C. Smith
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is
presented

in good faith and not for delay but for the purpose of

avoiding, if possible, or at least limiting, the further costs, expenses
and delay that will necessarily be incurred by a retrial.

Attorney for Petitioners/
Respondents Smith
Served the foregoing Petition by delivering four copies thereof
to James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Appellant, 6775 South 900 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84107-0280, this 31st day of March, 1988.
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James A. Mclntyre - 2196
McINTYRE & DENNIS, P.C.
Attorney for Western Auto
Radiator Co., Inc.
P. 0. Box 7280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280
Telephone: (801) 561-8500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT,
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES,
and DANIEL WAYMAN,
1
)

Plaintiffs,

STIPULATION FOR SECURITY IN
LIEU OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND

vs.
WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO.
INC., a Utah Corporation, and )
WILLIAM W. BOWERBANK, WILLARD )
L. SMITH, JONATHAN BOWERBANK, '
KIM BOWERBANK and KEITH C.
SMITH,
]
Defendants.
1

Western

Auto

Radiator

counsel, and Willard

Civil No. C84-924

Co.,

L. Smith

Inc.,

and

by

Keith

and

through

its

C. Smith, by and

through their counsel, hereby stipulate as follows:
1.
the

sums

Western Auto Radiator Co. will immediately transfer
of

$4,029.69

and

$13,208.76

from

Western

Auto

Radiator accounts in Continental Bank to Guardian State Bank,
142 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Said sums of $4,029.69 and $13,208.76, together with

Western Auto Radiator funds in said Guardian State Bank in the

EXHIBIT "A"

sum of $15,843.07, shall be used to purchase a Certificate of
Deposit issued by Guardian State Bank to Western Auto Radiator
Co.,

Inc., authorized

signatures

concerning

which

shall be

those of James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Western Auto Radiator
Co. and David S. Cook, attorney for Willard L. Smith and Keith
C. Smith.
3.

Said Certificate of Deposit shall bear such maturity

date and such interest rate as may be determined by Western
Auto Radiator Co. and Guardian State Bank.

The Certificate of

Deposit shall be held by David S. Cook, attorney for Willard
L. Smith and Keith C. Smith, pending resolution of the appeal
taken by Western Auto Radiator Co. in the captioned action and
shall

stand

in lieu of a supersedeas bond and for the same

purpose until said appeal has been finally resolved.
4.

The making of this stipulation shall not constitute

any waiver of claims or positions any party may desire to take
in connection with said appeal.
5.

The making of this stipulation does not constitute a

waiver of the Smiths1 claim against Western Auto Radiator Co.,
Inc. for interest at the judgment rate on the judgment in this
matter

dated

May

8,

1986, in

favor

of

the Smiths against

Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc.
DATED this

/?%

day of September, 1986.
Western Auto Radiator Company, Inc.

JAMES/ri/ McINTYRE, AttorneV) for

WestecjT Auto Radiator Company, Inc.

DATED this

J2

day of September, 1986.
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith

DAVIDS. Ca^J<r Attorney for Willard
L. Smith and Keith C. Smith

****xx*x*yt*Jtw***W***W**WX****ie*x*
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E

* * • * •
PAYABLE TO'
TYPE OF TCD

P.O. BOX 1947
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110
DOLLARS
/1QQ***********************
ADDRE
ESS 567 South 2nd e a s t SIC 84111

r*Tr»^rTTC?DKT
ATTT^V D Jl H T R .TVNO
WESTERN
AOTO
RADIATOR
INTEREST RATE

(NTEREST PAYABLE

SOC SEC. OR TAX ID NO.

00

87-0272096

per
% annum

5.75

212

N2

GUTODW1 STOTC BNNK

miS CERTIFIES THAT THERE HAS BEEN DEPOSITED
IN THIS INSTITUTION THE AMOUNT OF

183Days

DATE OF ISSUE

9-24-86

MATURITY DATE

AMOUNT DEPOSITED

3-26-87

33081.12

f THIS CERTIFICATE IS AUTOMATICALLY RENEWABLE IT WILL BE RENEWED FOR SUCCESSIVE LIKE MATURITY PERIODS IF THE CERTIFICATE IS NOT PRESENTED AND SURRENDERED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN SEVEN
7) Q D A r S — ONE. (1) DAY O AFTER THE ORIGINAL OR ANY RENEWEO MATURITY DATE, OR UNLESS THE INSTITUTION ISSUES OR MAILS NOTICE TO THE CONTRARY TO DEPOSITORS). OR TO EITHER OR ANY
X SAID DEPOSITORS AT LEAST TEN (10) BUSINESS DAYS BEFORE ANY SUCH MATURITY DATE. AND ANY MAILED NOTICE SHALL BE SENT TO THE ADDRESS AfiiOVE OR THEN DESIGNATED ON INSTITUTION'S RE;ORDS THE INTEREST RATE FOR EACH RENEWAL PERIOD SHALL BE THE PREVAILING RATE OF THE INSTITUTION ON NEW TIME CERTIFICATES OF LIKE DURATION ON RENEWAL DATE. SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE
RESENT AND FUTURE STATE AND FEOERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN THE EVENT CERTIFICATE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENEWED, DEPOSIT BEARS NO INTEREST AFTER ORIGINAL OR FINAL RENEWED MATURTY
HIS CERTIFICATE IS PAYABLE IN CURRENT FUNDS AT MATURITY UPON SURRENDER OF THIS CERTIFICATE PROPERLY ENDORSED THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BE REDEEMED IN ADVANCE OF THE MATURITY DATE ONLY
VITH THE CONSENT OF THE INSTITUTION AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PtNALTY FOR EARLY WITHDRAWAL. THE MATURITY OF THIS CERTIFICATE WILL BE
kFTER THE DATE OF ISSUE OF THIS CERTIFICATE THEREAFTER THIS CERTIFICATE WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS
MATURrnr

INTEREST DISTRIBUTION

183

Q MONTHS Cpf>AYS
Q WEEKS

INTEREST INTERVAL

C RENEWABLE

QCADDTOTCD

•

Q NON-RENEWABLE

• SEND INTEREST BY CASHIER'S CHECKS
D DEPOSIT TO ANOTHER ACCOUNT

CXAT MATURITY

D YEARS

QUARTERLY FROM INTEREST DATE

bA+y

O OTHER

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

i: 121.00 273 Bi:

=&

Z

=SX^Cg&£ TRANSFERABLE ONLY ON THE BOOKS OF, OR WITH PERMISSION OF, THE ISSUING INSTITUTION. <^Q^XF
^*^
NON-NEGOTIABLE
^ ^

•te*t Bar* Not* SO0 (V85)

EARLY WITHDRAWAL PENALTY
tear Depositor.
:

»nancial Regulatory Agencies require us to furnish you with the following information concerning the Early Withdrawal Penalty applicable to your deposit:
You may not withdraw all or any part of your deposit prior to maturity except with the consent of the Financial Institution, which may be given only at the time
such request for withdrawal is made.
H the Financial institution consents to withdrawal before maturity, at the time the withdrawal is made, the following applicable penalty will be assessed: (check
Applicable Deposit)
• # )

Time Deposit No

? 1 7,1

maturing on

3-26-8*7

•

1.) If the maturity is one year or lets, but at least 32 days, you must forfeit the equivalent of one month interest on the amount withdrawn calculated at the nominal (simple interest) rate being paid on the time deposit.
2.) If the maturity is more than one year, you must forfeit the equivalent of three months interest on the amount withdrawn calculated at the nominal (simple interest) rate being paid on the time deposit.
3.) If the amount required to bs forfeited exceeds the amount of earned interest in your account, this amount will be deducted from the amount you
request to withdraw.
, issued on_

D B) 7-31 Day Certificate of Deposit No.
1.) You must forfeit an amount equal to the greater of:

i. All interest earned on the amount withdrawn from the most recent of the date of deposit, the date of maturity, or the date on which notice
was given; or
ii. The equivalent of all interest that could have been earned on the amount during a period equal to 1/2 the fixed maturity term or required
notice period.
2.) In addition, for any day where the principal balance of the certificate falls below
interest will be payable only at the
maximum rate allowable for regular savings deposits or accounts.
3.) Deposits made after the date of issue, if such additional deposits are allowed, must remain on deposit for the full notice period or fixed term.
Withdrawals will be deemed to be from the funds on deposit the longest.
[. If the amount required to be forfeited exceeds the amount of earned interest on your certificate/account, this amount will be deducted from the amount you
request to withdraw.
. No penalty will be assessed for withdrawals in the event you, as the owner of the funds, become deceased, or are judicially declared mentally incompetent.
Sign the statement below that applies to you.
The undersigned acknowledges receipt of a copy hereof.
UNDER PENALTIES PERJURY, I eaffty thai I am an aiampt radpiant undar * t
Urn (aaa inatruebom).

v

87-0272096

SOCIAL S*fljRITY NJJM8ER OR EMPLOYER I D . NUMBER

UNDER PENALTIES OF PEjrfuRY. I ewWy thattfwabova mimbar it my ©©"act
ton numb*.

^j

toipaVttai
\

UNDER PENALTIES Of PERJURY. I CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT SUBJECT TO BACKUP WlTHHOtDMQ +** bacauaa I hava not baa* «o**ad lhat » am »ub^ct to backup iHhhokttog a* a raawft of
a lanwa » rapon a«< miaraat or o>**aa«di or ma mtamai Ravanua Sarvioa haa no«mad ma ttat I am

Depositor's
Signature _

Date.

Depositor's
Signature _

Date.

see attached signature rarri

